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NO. 39557

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael A. Gandenberger appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation and executing his sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2005, Gandenberger was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child
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under sixteen for conduct involving his seven-year-old niece.
State's Exhibit 2.)

(6/20/05 PSI, pp.1-2;

The district court granted a withheld judgment and placed

Gandenberger on probation for four years. (State's Exhibit 2.) In 2010, Gandenberger
was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and of a misdemeanor violation of
I.C. §18-8329 for living at a residence within 500 feet of a school. (12/9/10 PSI, pp.1-2;
R., pp.149-158.) On the felony charge, the district court imposed a unified five-year
sentence with one year fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Gandenberger
on supervised probation for five years. (R., pp.149-158.)
In 2011, Gandenberger told a law enforcement officer that he sexually touched a
three-year-old relative who was sleeping inside the house during a barbeque.
p.173; 11/22/11 Tr., p.16, L.15 - p.17, L.4.)

(R.,

The state filed a report of probation

violation, alleging that Gandenberger violated his probation by committing a new crime,
and by initiating, maintaining, or establishing conduct with a minor without the presence
of an approved supervisor. (R., pp.173-175.)
At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, Gandenberger argued that his admission
to the law enforcement officer was the product of a delusion brought about by his
condition of paranoid schizophrenia.

(12/6/11 Tr., p.12, L.11 -

p.13, L.21.)

Gandenberger presented testimony from a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner
who discussed Gandenberger's mental illness. (11/22/11 Tr., p.39, L.9 - p.48, L.16.)
He also presented testimony from two adult relatives who were present at the barbeque,
and who both testified that Gandenberger had no opportunity to be alone with his
alleged victim there. (11/22/11 Tr., p.49, L.18- p.59, L.12; 12/6/11 Tr., p.4, L.3- p.10,
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L.18.)
The district court concluded that the state failed to prove by a preponderance of
evidence that Gandenberger violated his probation by committing a new offense by
abusing a minor.

(12/6/11 Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.22, L.6.)

However, the court also

concluded that the state proved Gandenberger violated his probation by initiating,
maintaining, or establishing conduct with minors present at the barbeque without the
presence of an approved supervisor. (12/6/11 Tr., p.17, L.9 - p.19, L.16.) The district
court revoked Gandenberger's probation and executed the original unified sentence of
five years with one year fixed. (R., pp.188-192.) Gandenberger timely appealed. (R.,
pp.193-196.)

3

ISSUE
Gandenberger states the issue on appeal as:
Whether, absent any substantial and competent evidence to support a
finding that Mr. Gandenberger willfully violated the terms of his probation, the
district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was in error.
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Gandenberger failed to show that the district court erred in revoking his
probation and executing his sentence?

4

ARGUMENT
Gandenberger Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Revoking His
Probation And Executing His Sentence
A.

Introduction
Gandenberger asserts that the district court erred by revoking his probation.

(Appellant's brief, pp.7-19.)

Specifically, Gandenberger contends that I.C.R. 33(e),

which was amended in 2012 to require courts to find a willful probation violation before
revoking probation, applied retroactively to his 2011 probation violation hearings. (Id.)
Gandenberger contends that the district court violated this rule by revoking his probation
without finding a willful violation. (Id.) In the alternative, Gandenberger contends that
even if the newly amended I.C.R. 33(e) did not apply retroactively to his probation
hearings, the district court erred by failing to consider alternatives to incarceration
before revoking probation. (Id.)
Gandenberger's argument fails because the amended I.C.R. 33(e) is a
procedural court rule enacted and amended by the Idaho Supreme Court, that does not
apply retroactively to hearings conducted before the amendment became effective.
Further, substantial evidence in the record exists to show that Gandeberger's probation
violation was willful, and in any event, the district court considered several alternatives
to incarceration before revoking Gandenberger's probation.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. Lafferty, 125
Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).
This Court will not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility
of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 207, 953 P.2d 645,
647 (Ct. App. 1988).

C.

Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e), As Newly Amended. Does Not Apply Retroactively To
Prior Probation Violation Hearings
At the time of the 2011 probation violation hearings in the present case, I.C.R.

33(e) read as follows:
The court shall not revoke probation except after hearing at which
the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such
action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such
hearing.
I.C.R. 33(e), 2011; see also 2/9/12 Idaho Supreme Court Order, "In Re: Amendments of
Idaho Criminal Rules (I.C.R.) 6.6, 16, 25(a), 33, 41(a), 43 and 54.11."
In 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court amended I.C.R. 33(e) to include the following
sentence: "The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the
defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully
violated a condition of probation." (2/9/12 Idaho Supreme Court Order.) The Court

1

For the Court's convenience, a copy of the Idaho Supreme Court's February 9, 2012
order amending I.C.R. 33 is attached hereto as Appendix A.
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specifically ordered that the amendment become effective July 1, 2012. (Id.)
Citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352-353 (2004), and Rhoades v.
State, 149 Idaho 130, 139, 233 P.3d 61, 70 (2010), Gandenberger asserts that the
amended I.C.R. 33(e) is a "new substantive rule" that applies retroactively to his 2011
probation hearings, and that the district court thus violated I.C.R. 33(e) by revoking his
probation and executing the original sentence without finding a willful violation.
(Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Gandenberger is incorrect.
In Schriro, the United States Supreme Court discussed the retroactive application
of "new rules" resulting from opinions of that Court. Schriro, 542 at 351-358 (holding
that the "new rule" from Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that statutory aggravators
that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be decided by a jury, is not
subject to retroactive application); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292-316
(1989) (setting forth the relevant retroactivity criteria for new procedural and substantive
rules resulting from opinions of the United States Supreme Court).

In Rhoades, the

Idaho Supreme Court adopted the "Teague approach" when determining whether
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of Idaho should
be given retroactive effect in Idaho. Rhoades. 149 Idaho at 135-139, 233 P.3d at 66-70.
None of these cases address the retroactivity of procedural2 criminal rules

Contrary to Gandenberger's contention, I.C.R. 33(e) and the Idaho Criminal Rules are
procedural, by virtue of the Idaho Supreme Court's inherent authority under which they
are promulgated. See State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863, 541, 828 P.2d 891, 892
(1992) ("A careful reading of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and the legislature's
codification of the Idaho Supreme Court's rule making power, reveals that this Court's
rule making power goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules.") (emphasis in
original).
7
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enacted and amended by the Idaho Supreme Court through its inherent authority. Cf.
State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175, 177 P.3d 387, 389 (2008) ("The inherent power of
the Idaho Supreme Court to make rules governing procedure in all the courts of Idaho,
including the formulation of rules of criminal practice and procedure, has long been
recognized" (citations omitted)). In this instance, the Idaho Supreme Court utilized its
inherent authority to amend I.C.R. 33(e), and to order the amendment effective as of
July 1, 2012. (2/9/12 Idaho Supreme Court Order.) The amended rule did not apply to
hearings prior to the effective date established by the Idaho Supreme Court, including
Gandenberger's 2011 probation violation hearings.
Gandenberger has failed to show that the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e)
applied retroactively to his 2011 probation violation hearings. He has likewise failed to
show that the district court erred in failing to apply an amended rule which had not yet
become effective.
D.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Revoking Gandenberger's
Probation And Executing The Original Sentence
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions

of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053,
1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989).
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (quoting State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525,
8

529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)). If, however, the violation "was not willful, or
was beyond the probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order
imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the violation."
Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d at 713.
Contrary to Gandenberger's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the
applicable law supports the district court's determination that Gandenber's violation was
willful, and reveals that the district court considered alternatives to incarceration prior to
revoking Gandeberger's probation and executing the original sentence.

1.

The State Presented Substantial
Probation Violation Was Willful

Evidence

That

Gandenberger's

When considering whether a probation violation was willful, the Idaho appellate
courts review the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to show a
willful violation. See, §.JL., State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070
(Ct. App. 2003); Leach, 135 Idaho at 530-31, 20 P.3d at 714-15; Lafferty, 125 Idaho at
381,870 P.2d at 1340.
Term 3 of Gandenberger's Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision required
that Gandenberger not "initiate, maintain, or establish contact with any person, male or
female, under the age of 18 years, without the presence of an approved supervisor.
The supervisor must be over the age of 21 and be approved by both [Gandenberger's]
supervising officer and therapist."

(State's Exhibit 5.)

At the evidentiary hearing,

Gandenberger's probation officer explained that under this standard sex offender term
of probation, a potential "supervisor" meets with the probation officer and therapist and
9

undergoes a background check prior to "approval." (11/22/11 Tr., p.31, L.11 - p.32,
L.16.)

The probation officer also testified that Gandenberger had no approved

supervisors, and therefore was entirely prohibited from initiating, maintaining, or
establishing contact with any person, male or female, under the age of 18 years.
(11/22/11 Tr., p.27, L.6 - p.28, L.5; p.32, L.17 - p.34, L.3.)
The district court concluded that Gandenberger violated this term of probation.
(12/6/11 Tr., p.17, L.9- p.19, L.16.) At the disposition hearing, the court stated that the
violation was "clearly, in my view, a willful violation." 3 (12/20/11 Tr., p.34, L.24 - p.35,
L.5.)

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's

conclusion.
At the evidentiary hearing, Gandenberger's step-father, who lived with
Gandenberger and was present at the barbeque, indicated that he was unaware of the
"approval" requirement for supervisors, and that he instead understood Term 3 of
Gandenberger's Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision to permit Gandenberger to
have contact with minors as long as he was supervised by any adult. (12/6/11 Tr., p.4,
L.3 - p.5, L.5; p.9, L.1 - p.10, L.13.)

Gandenberger did not testify at the evidentiary

hearing and did not present evidence regarding his own understanding of Term 3. On
3

On appeal, Gandenberger contends that the district court did not expressly find that
the absence of an approved supervisor at the barbeque was "willful." (Appellant's brief,
pp.8-10.) Such a distinction is of no import to the issue on appeal. When a district court
finds that a defendant has violated his probation, unless the district court explicitly
states otherwise, the presumption is that the violation was willful. See State v.
Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 844 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting the district court "implicitly
determined that Peterson's disregard of the reporting obligation was willful"). In this
case, the district court expressly concluded that the violation as a whole was willful, and
at worst, implicitly determined that the absence of an approved supervisor at the
barbeque was willful as well.
10

appeal, as at the evidentiary hearing, Gandenberger argues that he misunderstood
Term

3 of his

Sexual

Offender Agreement

of Supervision,

misunderstanding rendered his violation "unwillful."

and

that

this

(12/6/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-7;

Appellant's brief, pp.7-15.)
In analyzing whether a probation violation is "willful," or "beyond the probationer's
control," the Idaho Court of Appeals has considered whether the probationer correctly
understood a probationary term. See Leach, 135 Idaho at 530-531, 20 P.3d at 714715.4

However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has also held that such correct

understanding of a probationary term could be established by a probationer's
acknowledgment of the term prior to the commencement of probation.

See State v.

Fife, 114 Idaho 103, 105-106, 753 P.2d 839, 841-842 (Ct. App. 1988).
In this case, the state presented evidence that Gandenberger acknowledged
Term 3 of his Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision.

The state admitted into

evidence the agreement itself, which contained Gandenberger's initials next to Term 3,
as well as his full signature at the bottom of the agreement. (12/6/11 Tr., p.1, L.23 4 Idaho Code§ 18-101(1) provides that the term "willfully," "when applied to the intent
with which an act is done or omitted," "implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit
the act or make the omission referred to" and "does not require any intent to violate the
law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage." This definition would indicate
that a probationer's correct understanding of his probationary terms is not relevant to a
determination of whether the violation is "willful." However, Leach provides that a court
may not revoke probation and order imprisonment without first considering alternative
methods to address the violation if either a violation "was not willful," or if the violation
was "beyond the probationer's control." Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d 709 at 713.
A probation violation may be beyond a probationer's control, if, for example, the term is
modified without probationer being so notified. In this case, the state asserts that
evidence that Gandenberger was notified of his probation conditions, and that he
acknowledged the condition at issue in this case, preclude his claim that the violation
was "beyond his control."
11

p.2, L.9; State's Exhibit 5.) The state also admitted an Idaho Department of Correction
Sex Offender In-Office Report, on which Gandenberger answered affirmatively that he
had "reviewed [his] Court order(s) and/or parole agreement and all signed IDOC
documents" since being placed on probation. (12/6/11 Tr., p.1, L.23 - p.2, L. 7; State's
Exhibit 6.) In addition, Term 3 of the agreement was clear, and there was no ambiguity
as to the requirement that any supervisor be "approved." (State's Exhibit 5.)
Further, there is substantial evidence in the record that Gandenberger's contact
with minors at the barbeque was willful. Gandenberger told a law enforcement officer
that he was present at the barbeque with his cousin's minor daughter. (11/22/11 Tr.,
p.16, Ls.15-20.)

Gandenberger's adult cousin testified that her two minor children

attended the barbeque, and that they interacted with Gandenberger at these events.
(11/22/11 Tr., p.50, L.9 - p.57, L.2.)

Gandenberger's step-father testified that

Gandenberger was outside during these barbeques, where he "kind of chases [the
children] around a little bit or plays tag and stuff like that." (12/6/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-22;
p.8, Ls.22-25.)
The record reveals that substantial evidence was presented at the evidentiary
hearing to show that Gandenberger acknowledged and understood Term 3 of his
Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision, and that he willfully violated this term by
initiating, maintaining, or establishing contact with minors. The record thus supports the
district court's finding that Gandenberger's probation violation was willful.

12

2.

The District Court Considered Alternatives To Incarceration

Even if this Court determines there is not substantial evidence to support the
district court's finding that Gandenberger's probation violation was willful, this does not
compel the conclusion that the district court erred in revoking Gandenberger's
probation.

Prior to the 2012 amendment of I.C.R. 33(e), a district court could revoke

probation for a violation that was not willful if it "determine[d] that alternatives to
imprisonment [were] not adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate
interest in punishment, deterrence, or the protection of society." Sanchez, 149 Idaho at
106, 233 P.3d at 37 (quoting Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d at 713).
In this case, the district court considered alternatives to revocation and
imprisonment. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearings, the district court stated
that it wished for the probation officer to testify and provide recommendations at the
disposition hearing. (12/6/11 Tr., p.22, L.20 - p.23, L.23.) At the disposition hearing,
the probation officer expressed his concern for the difficulty involved with supervising a
probationer who could have delusions about violating his probation. ( 12/20/11 Tr., p.4,
Ls.5-15; p.5, L.20 - p.6, L.8.)

Specifically, the probation officer testified that if

Gandenberger was "having a hard time differentiating what's real and not real, that can
be very dangerous, I think."

(12/20/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-8.)

The probation officer also

expressed concern about Gandenberger's living situation, in that Gandenberger had
been living with a relative who apparently was not familiar with Gandenberger's terms of
supervision and was hosting barbeques where children were present. (12/20/11 Tr.,
p.4, L.17 - p.5, L.2.)
13

In asking that Gandenberger be placed back on probation, Gandenberger's
counsel referenced a letter from Gandenberger's psychiatric mental health nurse
practitioner, written prior to the evidentiary hearings, which recommended that
Gandenberger be "[p]laced in an assisted living/group living environmenUcertified family
home," "have a legal guardian," and "attend outpatient treatment to include: medication
management, day treatment and chronic symptom management treatment." (12/20/11
Tr., p.29, L.8 - p. 32, L.18; Defendant's Exhibit A.) However, Gandenberger's counsel
did not provide any specific information or plan regarding any particular alternative living
arrangement

or

outpatient

treatment.

Further,

Gandenberger's

step-father

acknowledged at the disposition hearing that he had made no progress in establishing
himself as Gandenberger's legal guardian in the previous 10 months since he first
considered that possibility, and that he had not yet looked into any type of alternative
living arrangement for Gandenberger. (12/20/11 Tr., p.18, L.3- p.19, L.17.)
The district court recognized its discretion to revoke or continue probation.
(12/20/11 Tr., p.33, L.25 - p.34, L.11.)
disposition alternatives.

The court then expressly discussed the

(12/20/11 Tr., p.35, L.18 - p.38, L.12.)

The court was

appropriately unwilling to continue the status quo of Gandenberger's residency status
with his step-father in light of evidence that Gandenberger's family "didn't appreciate the
significance" of Gandenberger's terms of probation. (12/20/11 Tr., p.35, L.23 - p.36,
L.5.) The district court then considered the alternative disposition recommended by
Gandenberger's psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, but recognized that it had
been presented no specific alternative residency options or treatment program.
14

(12/20/11 Tr., p.36, L.16 - p.37, L.20.)

Finally, after stating that it had reviewed

Gandenberger's PSI and criminal record, the court recognized that there was a "public
safety risk here." (12/20/11 Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.38, L.7.) The court concluded that "the
best alternative" was to revoke probation, impose the sentence, and order mental health
treatment pursuant to I.C. § 19-2523. (12/20/11 Tr., p.38, Ls.13-17.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information, including alternatives
to incarceration, and reasonably determined that Gandenberger was no longer an
appropriate candidate for community supervision. Gandenberger has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion.
DATED this 9th day of January 2013.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this· Court affirm the district court's order
revoking probation and ordering his sentence executed.
/s/_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of December, 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/- - - - - - - - MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

i

IN RE: AMENDMENTS OF IDAHO
CRIMINAL RULES (l,C,R,) 6,6, 16,

)
)
)

25(a), 33, 41(a), 43 and 54.1

ORDER

I

,j
:1

The Court having reviewed the recommendations approved by the Criminal Rules

·I

j
I
:

Advisory Committee and the Administrative Conference to amend Idaho Criminal Rules,

,_I!

and the Court having fully considered the same;

1:'

I'
L

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Idaho Criminal Rules
as they appear in the volume published by the Idaho Code Commission be, and they are

:lIi

hereby, amended as follows:

,,II

ii

.;i
;j

l

,I

1. That Rule 6.6 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:

;t
I

'I

,j

i

ii

Rule 6.6 Indictment.

I'

***
(e) Return of no bill. If the grand iury concludes that probable cause is lacking and
no indictment shall be returned, that fact shall be placed in writing and maintained under
seal by the court as part of the record of that proceeding.

2. That Rule 16 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
Rule 16. Discovery and inspection.

***

!,

'I

(d) Redacting protected information from responses to discovery. The party
providing discovery may redact protected information from the information or material
provided.

i

1

J
.

~~--~..,.... __ . --:·:-..:f~
,1

'.I

'

i'
I

''

(1) Protected information means:
A. Contact information. The home addresses, business addresses,
telephone numbers (including cell phones), and email addresses of an
alleged victim, or of a witness, or of the spouse, children, or other close
family members of the alleged victim or witness. and the places where any
of such persons regularly go, such as schools and places of employment
and worship.
B. Personal identifying information. The dates of birth and social
security numbers of any persons other than the defendant.
C. Private information. Personal identification numbers (PINs),
passwords, financial account numbers, information relating to financial
transaction cards, and medical information protected by federal law that is
not directly related to the crime charged.
(2) A prosecuting attorney who redacts protected information shall follow the
following procedure:
A. If the defendant is represented by counsel, the prosecuting attorney
shall serve defendant's counsel with a redacted copy of the discovery
printed on white paper simultaneously with an unredacted copy of the
discovery printed on paper of a color that is clearly distinguishable from
white. The defendant's attorney. including appellate counsel, shall not
disclose the protected information to the defendant or to a member of the
defendant's family without the consent of the prosecuting attorney or an
order of the court upon a showing of need.
B. If the defendant is not represented by counsel, the prosecuting
attorney shall serve the defendant with a redacted copy of the discovery
and, within seven (7) days of doing so, even if the disclosure was not in
response to a discovery request. shall file with the court and serve upon
the defendant a motion for a protective order with respect to the redacted
information.
(3) A defense attorney or defendant who redacts protected information shall
serve the grosecuting attorney with a redacted copy of the discovery printed on
white paper simultaneously with an unredacted copy of the discovery printed on
paper of a color that is clearly distinguishable from white. The state's attorney.
including am:i:ellate counsel, shall not disclose the protected information to the
alleged victim or to a member of the alleged victim's family without the consent
of the defendant or an order of the court upon a showing of need.

(~) Failure to make written request, waiver.

I

***

r

2

i•

,I

!

i
I

·!

:i:ii
··1

;Ii

,[
!
·I

i

;1

:,

,,!I:

'i
'.I

ll

'.l

:1

!I

ij

:I

3. That Rule 2S(a) be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
Rule 25. Disqualification of judge.
(a) Disqualification of judge without cause. In all criminal actions, except actions

before drug courts or mental health courts, the parties shall each have the right to one
disqualification without cause of the judge or magistrate, except as herein provided,
under the following conditions and procedures:

***

l

ti.

I

l

i

i

(6) Alternate judges. If the presiding judge intends to have a panel of
judges as alternates to try the ease set fer preside at trial or at any other hearing or
proceeding in the case, a notice or amended notice of trial setting shall include a
list of judges who may alternatively be assigned to so preside at the trial if the
presiding judge is unavailable to try the ease. Upon service of the notice as to the
panel, each party shall have the right to file one ( 1) motion for the disqualification
without cause as to any altemathre alternate judge or magistrate not later than
fourteen ( 14) days after service of written notice listing the alternate judge§ or
magistrate§ Nho may preside at the frial ef the ease. Provided, if a party has
previously exercised the right to disqualification without cause under this Rule
25(a), that party shall have no right to disqualify an alternate judge or magistrate
under this subparagraph.
1

***

i

i

j
:1

!i

i

4. That Rule 3 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
Rule 33. Sentence and judgment.

***

:1

(e). Revocation of probation. The court shall not revoke probation except after
hearing at which the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which
such action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing.
The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a
finding by the court. following a hearing. that the defendant willfully violated a condition
of probation.
(0. Waiver of fees and costs.
(1) A person who has been sentenced by the court following a plea of guilty or
finding of guilt may have his or her probation revoked or be found to be in contempt for
failure to pay a fine. fee. or costs only if the court finds that the person has willfully
refused to make such payment, or has failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to legally
acquire the resources to make such payment.
(2) A fee or cost imposed by statute on persons who plead guilty to or are found
guilty of any offense may be waived in whole or part by the court only when there is a
specific provision in statute allowing for the waiver of such fee or cost.
3
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(3) A court may waive all or part of a fee or costs imposed by statute only upon
making findings in writing or on the record that each statutory standard for the waiver of
such fee or costs has been satisfied, If the court decides to waive such fee or costs in
whole or in part. the court shall make such detennination with regard to each offense on
which the defendant is or has been sentenced. and shall determine whether such fee or
costs shall be waived in whole or in part.

5. That Rule 4l(a) be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
Rule 41. Search and seizure.
(a) Authority to issue warrant, A search warrant authorized by this rule or

by the Idaho Code may be issued by ,a district judge or magistrate within the
judicial district wherein the county of proper venue is located property or persofl.
soaght is located upon request of a law enforcement officer or any attorney for the
state of Idaho. Where it does not appear that the property or person sought is
currently within the territorial boundaries of the state of Idaho. such warrant may
still be issued: however, no such issuance will be deemed as granting authority to
serve said warrant outside the territorial boundaries of the State.
11
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6. That Rule 43 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
Rule 43. Presence of the defendant.
(a) Presence required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time

of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return
of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise pmvided by this
rule.
(b) Continued presence not required. The further progress of the trial to and
including the return of the verdict, or the progress of any other proceeding. shall not be
prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived defendant's right to be
present whenever a defendant, initially present:
(1) Is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or not the
defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to remain during the trial), or
(2) Who has previously been warned by the court, acts in a manner so
disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful as to substantially impede or makes impossible
orderly conduct of the trial or other proceeding. and the court may:

***

4
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7. That a Rule 54.1 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
Rule 54.1 Appeals from a magistrate to a district courtAppealable judgments and orders,

***
{j) Any order granting or denying a motion to set aside the forfeiture of bail or to

exonerate bail. An appeal from such an order shall not deprive the magistrate court of
jurisdiction over other proceedings involving the case or stay such proceedings,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this order and these amendments shall be
effective the first day of July, 2012.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the above designation of the striking of words

n
1

from the Rules by lining through them, and the designation of the addition of new

'

portions of the Rules by underlining such new portion is for the purposes of information
only as amended, and NO OTHER AMENDMENTS ARE INTENDED. The lining
through and underlining shall not be considered a part of the permanent Idaho Criminal

,!

Rules.
'

,,''
!

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall cause

'

•I·'

l

:1

notice of this Order to be published in one issue of The Advocate.
DATED this

'I

·!
ii

!:j}!_ day of February, 2012.
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By Order of the Supreme Court
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Chief Justice

ATTEST:

(J, .,

I

' f ) '~t

Clerk

,___,._ ,
I '-J,, ("

I

I, Stephen W. Kenyon, Qlert( of the Supreme Court
of the State of Idaho, do hereby certify that the
above Is a true and correct {;Opy of the
dC,C
entered In the above enlftled CIUl8 and now on

\ __
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record In my office.
•1
WITNE$8 my hand and the _Sul of thlt Court 2=-1)·\l 1
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